A signed webhook does not make a pull request trustworthy
Webhook authentication, repository admission, prompt-injection resistance, and execution isolation solve different problems. A valid signature does not make PR content safe to follow or run.
Webhook authentication, repository admission, prompt-injection resistance, and execution isolation solve different problems. A valid signature does not make PR content safe to follow or run.
A finding is not permission to edit. A practical policy for bounded automatic fixes, grounded in the PR reviewer’s disabled-by-default fixer primitives.
A practical approach to agent guardrails: narrow permissions, revision-specific reviews, validated outputs, visible failures, and explicit stopping conditions.
Inside a small Hermes-backed PR reviewer: signed webhooks, per-commit job identity, worker dispatch, visible failures, and an important queue limitation.
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