A signed webhook does not make a pull request trustworthy
Webhook authentication, repository admission, prompt-injection resistance, and execution isolation solve different problems. A valid signature does not make PR content safe to follow or run.
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Agent artifacts need an expiration date
Retention is part of an agent workflow’s design: preserve useful evidence, bound sensitive output, and avoid deleting the state that makes recovery and deduplication work.
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When should an agent be allowed to fix code?
A finding is not permission to edit. A practical policy for bounded automatic fixes, grounded in the PR reviewer’s disabled-by-default fixer primitives.
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Operating an agent workflow: status, evidence, and failure visibility
A practical look at the PR reviewer’s operations CLI, why a successful process is not a successful workflow, and which failures a simple health summary can miss.
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Testing agent workflows without calling a model
Use deterministic fixtures to test validation, orchestration, and failure policy. Save live model calls for the questions those tests cannot answer.
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A webhook is not a durable queue
What happens when a PR review worker is busy or crashes? A look at the gap between accepting a webhook and reliably completing the work it triggers.
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Structured agent outputs: reviewer, fixer, arbiter
How the PR reviewer validates agent outputs and reduces them into decisions, and why valid JSON is still a long way from verified correctness.
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Building a Hermes-backed GitHub PR reviewer
Inside a small Hermes-backed PR reviewer: signed webhooks, per-commit job identity, worker dispatch, visible failures, and an important queue limitation.